States.
2 The defendant, accused of murder, offered the results of a "systolic blood pressure deception test," a precursor to the polygraph, as evidence of his innocence. At the time this was a novel technique and there was no community of experts using this technique.
3 Judge Van Orsdel resolved the issue in only two pages. The key passage established what has come to be called the "general acceptance test." 4 Expert testimony is admissible when the scientific principle or technique from which it is deduced has gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. Slowly but surely the Frye test became the dominant standard by which to judge the admissibility of expert testimony. 5 With the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in the 1970s, the Frye test began a slow decline in the federal courts. Criticisms of the test 6 and the fact that the reporter's notes accompanying the new Federal Rules did not even mention the case when discussing the admissibility of expert testimony caused a number of federal circuits to abandon Frye. 7 Other circuits, however, concluded Frye did survive the adoption of the rules. The Ninth was one of these circuits. PSYCH 117 (1917) . 4 "Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while the courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
5 See, e.g., United States v. Skeens, 494 F.2d 1050 , 1053 (D.C.Cir. 1974 ) and Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (Md. 1978 for statements to this effect. 6 Some criticized the test for being too conservative because it imposes a waiting period while new theories and techniques gain general acceptance. During this time the law is deprived of valuable information. Others criticized for exactly the opposite reason: It was too liberal. This is because of the difficulty of defining the relevant field within which general acceptance must be achieved. If the field is narrowly defined to include the proffered expert and other like-minded individuals, little will be excluded. See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980 . 7 The most influential early circuit court opinion rejecting Frye is United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985 . In a case involving expert testimony on eyewitness identification, Judge Becker said that in order to be admitted the evidence must survive the trial court's preliminary inquiry. In an in limine proceeding, the judge should balance: (1) the reliability of the scientific principles the expert employed against (2) the likelihood that the evidence may overwhelm or mislead the jury. In addition, the trial court should examine the "fit" between the proffered scientific testimony and the contested issues in the case. Id. at 1226. Concern with reliability and fit have become cornerstones of post-Daubert jurisprudence.
8 United States v. Solomon, 753 F.2d 1522 , 1526 (9th Cir. 1985 .
Daubert
Jason Daubert and Eric Schuler both suffer from limb reduction birth defects. They sued Merrell Dow, the manufacturer of Bendectin, claiming that the morning sickness drug, which their mothers ingested during pregnancy, caused their defects. The trial judge granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
9
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
10 It held the plaintiff's expert testimony inadmissible because its underlying methodology diverged substantially from the procedures and techniques generally accepted in the field.
11
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, primarily to announce Frye's demise as the sole test for admissibility.
12 It found Frye's rigid "general acceptance" standard to be contrary to the thrust of the Federal Rules which were intended to lower barriers to expert opinion testimony.
13 However, the basic rule governing the admissibility of expert testimony, Rule 702, does modify the general evidence rule that all relevant testimony is admissible. Expert opinion evidence must not only be relevant, it must also be reliable; evidence which is relevant but unreliable is inadmissible. Expert opinion based on a scientific technique "is admissible if it is generally accepted as a reliable technique among the scientific community. . . ." For expert opinion based on a given scientific methodology to be admissible, the methodology cannot diverge significantly from the procedures accepted by recognized authorities in the field. If it does so diverge, it cannot be shown to be "generally accepted as a reliable technique," and a district court must exclude it. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 , 1129 -30 (9th Cir. 1991 (quoting United States v. Solomon, 753 F.2d 1522 , 1526 (9th Cir. 1985 . 12 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 2792 -93, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993 . The Court's purpose is revealed by its refusal to grant certiorari in two other Bendectin cases, Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 113 S.Ct. 84 (1992) denying petition for writ of certiorari); Lee v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. 113 S.Ct. 192 (1992) (same), both of which, like Daubert resulted in a summary judgment for the defendant. The primary difference between these cases and Daubert was the Ninth Circuit's exclusive reliance on the Frye rule to justify a summary judgment.
13 113 S.C. at 2794. In the period immediately following the Daubert decision, various interest groups wrote articles designed to put a pro-defense or pro-plaintiff spin on the opinion. Not surprisingly, plaintiff groups picked up on the language in Daubert declaring the new rule to be more liberal. See Kenneth J. Chesebro, Taking Daubert's "Focus" Seriously: The Methodology/ Conclusion Distinction 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1745 Rev. (1994 In addition, the Court noted that Rule 702 requires that the expert evidence "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Justice Blackmun said that "This condition goes primarily to relevance. . . . The consideration has been aptly described by Judge Becker as one of 'fit.' 'Fit' is not always obvious, and scientific validity for one purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes."
22 The "fit" requirement involves an assessment of whether the expert's chain of reasoning contains an inferential gap that is too wide.
As with Frye, Daubert is not without its critics. If the Daubert test allows judges a more active role and provides for a more nuanced analysis than is possible under Frye, it is also true that this very flexibility makes Daubert a more uncertain test that may produce inconsistent admissibility rulings. Moreover, the test depends on a minimum level of judicial competence. For better or worse, the federal courts are fully committed to Daubert and most state courts seem to be following along in their wake. However, a number of states, including California, Florida, and New York, continue to adhere to the Frye test.
23
At bottom, the Daubert revolution is about the relationship between judges and experts, between law and science. Frye asked judges to acquiesce to the judgment of the relevant scientific community. Daubert on the other hand, invites the trial court to make an independent inquiry. The judge should determine whether the proffered evidence is reliable by examining the reasoning and methodology underlying the expert's testimony. To be sure, the opinion allows judges to make use of surrogate indicia of reliability. Peer review and publication and general acceptance in the scientific community are factors judges may consider, but they are secondary to a direct assessment of the testimony's scientific validity. As Michael Saks recently noted, "perhaps the purpose of the 16 rules is simply to hold up a target to the courts; call one the Frye target and the other the Daubert target. The Frye ideal says: do whatever the experts tell you to do. The Daubert ideal says: figure out the science yourself."
24

Joiner
The second case in the Supreme Court trilogy was General Electric Co. v. Joiner. 25 In Joiner, the Eleventh Circuit held appellate courts should adopt "a particularly stringent standard of review to the trial judge's exclusion of expert testimony."
26 Using this standard, it reversed the trial court decision to exclude the plaintiff's expert opinion, in part because the judge had excluded the experts' testimony because it "drew different conclusions from the research than did each of the experts" 27 contrary to Daubert's assertion that in making its Rule 702 assessment "the focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate."
28
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. It held that with respect to all admissibility decisions the proper level of review is the liberal "abuse of discretion" standard under which a district court's decision should be overturned only when it is manifestly erroneous.
The Supreme Court also took the opportunity to revisit its terse and perhaps incautious methodology/conclusion distinction. The statement seemed to be in conflict with another part of the Daubert opinion where the court noted that Rule 702 requires that the scientific evidence must "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." The Daubert court noted that "This condition goes primarily to relevance. . . . The consideration has been aptly described by Judge Becker as one of 'fit.' 'Fit' is not always obvious, and scientific validity for one purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes." 29 Many 'fit' analyses in the years following Daubert ultimately concluded that the evidence available to an expert does not address the particular disputed fact questions posed by the case, 30 i.e., there was no fit between the data and the conclusions the expert wished to draw. Most courts downplayed the Supreme Court's methodology-conclusion distinction. For example, in an important Paoli opinion following Daubert, Judge Becker himself said "we think that [the distinction between principles and methods versus conclusions] has only limited practical import . . . a challenge to 'fit' is very close to a challenge to the expert's ultimate conclusion about the particular case, and yet it is part of the judge's admissibility calculus under Daubert." 579, 589 -91, 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 2795 -96, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993 . 30 In Re Paoli, 35 F.3d 717, 743 (3d Cir. 1994) . 31 In Re Paoli, 35 F.3d 717, 746 (3d Cir. 1994) . One large piece of the long and tortured history of the Paoli litigation finally came to a conclusion with a jury verdict in favor of the defendants on In Joiner, the Supreme Court basically ratified Judge Becker's view. It noted that conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another. "[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered. That is what the District Court did here and we hold that it did not abuse its discretion in so doing."
32
Kumho Tire
In Footnote 8 of the Daubert opinion, the Court limited its holding to scientific evidence. It noted that Rule 702 applies to "technical or other specialized knowledge" as well, but added, "Our discussion is limited to the scientific context because that is the nature of the expertise offered here." 33 In addition, the opinion made it clear that the four reliability factors: testability, error rate, peer review and publication, and general acceptance, are not exclusive.
34 These passages presented two related questions to post-Daubert courts: does Daubert's reliability requirement apply at all to non-scientific evidence and, if it does, what role do the Daubert factors play in these cases?
Lower court opinions provided conflicting answers to both of these questions in areas such as forensic document examination, 35 clinical medical testimony, 36 and engineering failure analysis in products liability cases. 37 The Supreme Court resolved these questions in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael. 38 In July of 1993, eight members of the Carmichael family were involved in a serious automobile accident when the right rear tire of their minivan failed because the tire tread became separated from its inner steel-belted carcass. After all claims involving issues of exposure, causation, medical monitoring, and property damages, affirmed on appeal. In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, 113 F.3d 444 (3d Cir. 1997 the accident, the plaintiffs' expert examined the tire and determined the failure was not the result of any abuse. He, therefore, concluded the failure was caused by a defect in either the tire's design or its manufacture. Prior to his testimony, the expert became ill and transferred the case to his employee, Dennis Carlson, who reviewed the file and confirmed the initial conclusion. Carlson did not personally examine the tire prior to rendering his opinion and he inspected the tire for the first time approximately one hour prior to his deposition by the defendant. 39 The defendant moved to exclude Carlson's testimony because it could not satisfy Daubert. The trial judge agreed and found that, "none of the four admissibility criteria outlined by the Daubert court are satisfied in this case."
40 Because the expert testimony was the plaintiff's only evidence of defect, the district judge then granted the defendant summary judgment. 41 Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the district court should not have applied Daubert's reliability framework because Carlson was not a "scientific" expert.
42
The Eleventh Circuit undertook a de novo review of the trial court's decision to apply Daubert and its decision to exclude the particular evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. 43 It concluded Daubert applies only to scientific testimony, that Carlson's testimony was nonscientific, and therefore the district court erred as a matter of law in applying the Daubert criteria.
44
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed the Eleventh Circuit and held that excluding Carlson's testimony was not an abuse of discretion. 45 As to the Daubert reliability factors, the Court held that a trial court may consider one or more when doing so will help determine that testimony's reliability. 46 It would be a mistake, however, to read Kumho to say that the trial court may simply ignore the Daubert factors in nonscience cases. The Court noted that, "a trial court should consider the specific factors identified in Daubert where they are reasonable measures of the reliability of expert testimony." 47 In a concurring opinion, Justices Scalia, O'Connor, and Thomas added that the discretion enjoyed by the trial court does not include the discretion to abandon the gatekeeping function or to perform it inadequately: "Though, as the Court makes clear today, the Daubert factors are not holy writ, in a particular case the failure to apply one or another of them may be unreasonable, and hence an abuse of discretion." 48 v. Food Lion, Inc., 171 F.3d 308, 311-12 (5th Cir. 1999 ) ("In the vast majority of cases, the district court first should decide whether the factors mentioned in Daubert are appropriate.
As it did in its earlier opinion in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 50 the Court offered a detailed analysis of the excluded expert testimony. According to the Supreme Court, the question in the case was one of specific causation and particular methodology. 51 The issue was not whether it is ever possible for a tire expert to use visual and tactile inspection methods to determine whether a tire is defective. Rather, it was the specific question of whether this tire was defective and the reliability of Carlson's methods with respect to the tire in question.
52
Carlson's theory was that if the vehicle had been overloaded or the tire had been underinflated, this would have led to a phenomenon called "overdeflection." Overdeflection can cause the tire to overheat which in turn can undo the bond that holds the tire tread to the carcass. 53 Carlson described four indicia of overdeflection and adopted the rule that if a tire exhibited two of the four he would say it had been abused. 54 He conceded that the tire did exhibit some of these indicia, but he testified that the symptoms were not significant.
For example, according to Carlson, one of the symptoms of overdeflection is tread wear on the tire's shoulder greater than tread wear along the tire's center. Carlson concluded, apparently based on a visual inspection of the tire, that there was greater wear on the shoulders, but he also concluded that it was not evenly distributed on both shoulders. Rather, the wear appeared primarily on one shoulder whereas an overdeflected tire would show equal abnormal wear on both. 55 Therefore, this wear was not evidence of overdeflection.
In another part of his testimony, Carlson was asked how many miles the tire had traveled prior to the accident. According to the Supreme Court, he "could not say whether the tire had traveled more than 10, or 20, or 30, or 40, or 50 thousand miles, adding that 6,000 miles was 'about how far' he could 'say with any certainty. ' " 56 To this, the Supreme Court responded, 1997) . 51 In this respect, the issue in the Kumho case is similar to an issue that arises frequently in toxic tort cases. There, as here, courts distinguish "general causation," i.e., whether a given cause can ever produce a given effect, from "specific causation," i.e., did that cause this effect in this particular case. Here, as in toxic cases, plaintiffs who are able to show general causation may still fail to show that it was more likely than not that their particular injury was caused in the manner they allege. 52 119 S.Ct. at 1177. 53 119 S.Ct at 1172. 54 The court summarized his testimony:
These symptoms include (a) tread wear on the tire's shoulder that is greater than the tread wear along the tire's center; (b) signs of a "bead groove," where the beads have been pushed too hard against the bead seat on the inside of the tire's rim; (c) sidewalls of the tire with physical signs of deterioration, such as discoloration; and/or (d) marks on the tire's rim flange. . . . Carlson said that where he does not find at least two of the four physical signs just mentioned (and presumably where there is no reason to suspect a less common cause of separation), he concludes that a manufacturing or design defect caused the separation. 119 S.Ct. at 1172. 55 119 S.Ct at 1173. 56 119 S.Ct. at 1177.
the abuse-related significance of minute shoulder/center relative tread wear differences, but insufficiently precise to tell "with any certainty" from the tread wear whether a tire had traveled less than 10,000 or more than 50,000 miles. And these concerns might have been augmented by Carlson's repeated reliance on the "subjective[ness]" of his mode of analysis in response to questions seeking specific information regarding how he could differentiate between a tire that actually had been overdeflected and a tire that merely looked as though it had been.
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Although the Supreme Court did not specifically tie its analysis of Carlson's testimony to the Daubert factors, the reference to subjectivity suggests that it questioned the falsifiability and perhaps the error rate of Carlson's theory. The Court also noted the lack of general acceptance of Carlson's specific test, his decision rule that a tire has not been abused unless it exhibits two of his four overdeflection symptoms, and questioned Carlson's ability to make the very fine distinctions that he proffered in his testimony.
58
The Court did not offer any factors in addition to the four Daubert factors the trial court might use to assess reliability. However, it did note that the purpose of the relevancy and reliability requirements under Daubert is, "to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field." 59 In the Court's opinion, Carlson's testimony did not measure up to this standard.
60
The Daubert and Kumho Tire opinions are interesting from many perspectives. One topic that has received a fair amount of attention is the Supreme Court's implicit understanding of the nature of scientific and other types of expert knowledge. Most of this discussion has been addressed to Daubert and its implicit scientific epistemology. However, because Kumho Tire does not offer a different understanding of non-scientific evidence, the discussion can be extended easily to include that case as well.
Daubert's Implicit Scientific Epistemology
In the aftermath of the Daubert opinion, a number of articles have appeared that praise or criticize Justice Blackmun's understanding of science and the 57 119 S.Ct. at 1177. 58 119 S.Ct. at 1178. 59 119 S.Ct. 1176. The "same intellectual rigor" standard first appears in a pair of Seventh Circuit opinions authored by Judge Posner. Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 318 (7th Cir. 1996) ; Braun v. Lorillard Inc., 84 F.3d 230, 234 (7th Cir. 1996) . Post-Kumho appellate opinions have been quick to incorporate this standard in their opinions. See, e.g., Black v. Food Lion, Inc., 171 F.3d 308, 311 (5th Cir. 1999) . 60 Indeed, no one has argued that Carlson himself, were he still working for Michelin, would have concluded in a report to his employer that a similar tire was similarly defective on grounds identical to those upon which he rested his conclusion here. Of course, Carlson himself claimed that his method was accurate, but, as we pointed out in Joiner, "nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert." 522 U.S., at 146. Kumho, 119 S.Ct. at 1179. scientific enterprise. 61 The fact that some authors claim that Daubert comes closer than Frye to capturing the essential nature of the scientific enterprise, 62 while others see it as a fundamentally wrong turn, 63 suggests the substantial diversity of opinion concerning the epistemological underpinnings of science.
Most would agree, however, that Daubert offered a relatively unsophisticated view of science. 64 The court's admissibility rulings do seem to have proceeded in happy obliviousness to the "science wars"
65 that arguably began with Fleck, 66 flourished with Kuhn 67 and Feyerabend, 68 and have raged for much of the last half century between the defenders of a more traditional, realist view of science and those critics who emphasize its historical, political, social, and rhetorical aspects. 69 The Frye test implicitly places its trust in expert communities as neutral, truth-seeking collectives whose opinions are derived by an acceptable and agreed upon process. Daubert is a more skeptical test, decided against a background of an emerging belief that courts were experiencing a growth in "junk science." 70 It affords relatively less legitimacy to elite authoritative opinions and is less willing to accept the idea that communities of experts are the sole arbiters of specialized knowledge. In this sense, Daubert is consistent with a social constructionist view of science.
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This increased sensitivity to social, political, and economic pressures that impinge on expert judgment is reflected in a fifth admissibility factor frequently cited in post-Daubert opinions: whether experts are proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and directly out of research they conducted independent of the litigation. 72 This criterion now is very frequently mentioned in federal admissibility opinions. 73 The "non-judicial uses" test is a judicial acknowledgment that external pressures may bias expert testimony and the self-reflecting observation that the legal system itself imposes significant pressures on the parties and their experts.
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Kumho Tire also reflects a concern for the pressures that impinge on expert judgment. The Court's focus on whether an expert has applied the "same intellectual rigor" as people in her field implicitly recognizes that the pressures of litigation and party witnessing may influence expert testimony.
75
Daubert and Kumho Tire implicitly accept the notion that expert knowledge is influenced by the social, economic, and political situation of the expert and expert communities. Nevertheless they reject a radical social constructionist perspective that would argue that expert is opinion is solely the result of such influences. The opinion directs judges to become sufficiently knowledgeable about scientific methods so that they can fairly assess the validity of evidence 70 Peter Huber, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 6. (1991 Evidence, p. 47. (1999) .
74 See Samuel Gross, Expert Evidence. 1991 Wisconsin Law Review 1113 (1991 . 75 Patterson notes that external pressures do not come exclusively in the form of research done at the behest of an attorney. For example, a good deal of the research conducted in areas such as pharmacology is done at the behest of and with funding from companies who frequently appear as defendants in litigation concerning the products being studied. Mark R. Patterson, Conflicts of Interest in Scientific Expert Testimony. 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1313 , 1346 . Nevertheless, legal and scientific experts alike note the substantial additional pressures placed on an expert who becomes a party witness in an adversarial system. Mike Redmayne, Expert Evidence and Scientific Disagreement. 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1027 REV. , 1071 REV. (1997 . offered at trial. The requirement that scientific testimony must pass methodological muster is consistent with a belief in some form of scientific realism.
David Papineau notes that much of the current debate concerning the epistemology of science turns on one's commitment to scientific realism. 76 Papineau takes realism to involve two theses: an independence thesis that our judgments answer for their truth to a world which exists independently of our awareness of it, and a knowledge thesis that by and large, we can know which of these judgments are true. 77 Idealists reject the first thesis, the notion of some further world beyond the world as we perceive it. Most modern critics of the realist tradition in the philosophy and sociology of science are not idealist. Rather, they are skeptics who reject the knowledge thesis and accept the idea that we cannot know the truth about the world although scientific theories might be useful fictions for predictive purposes.
78 One important conclusion to be drawn from this line of analysis is that a commitment to scientific realism does not require one to reject the idea that the scientific enterprise is embedded in and influenced by the society around it. Rather, it simply requires one to believe that it is possible to know the truth about the world.
Daubert's focus on methods is a search for some assurance that the expert has given the empirical world a reasonable opportunity to influence and constrain the expert's conclusions. Ultimately, the opinion's scientific epistemology holds that there is a set of (social) practices often given the shorthand name "the scientific method" that increase the likelihood someone will arrive at a correct conclusion about the state of the world and thus make positive contributions to knowledge; a set of practices that scientists themselves frequently point to as the sources of past scientific success.
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In this regard, the Daubert opinion is not unique. Both legislatures and administrative agencies frequently distinguish the process of science from its products. They accept the constructionist insight that the process of doing science is a social enterprise and is subject to the buffeting, often distorting winds of 76 David Papineau, Introduction, in DAVID PAPINEAU (ED.) THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE pp. 1-20. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (1996) 77 Id. 78 Id. at 4. 79 Alvin Goldman provides one list of the dimensions of scientific practice that seem to play a role in science's relative success. They are:
(1) An emphasis on precise measurement, controlled test, and observation, including a philosophy, organon, and technology for more and more powerful observation. . 250 -51 (1999) social, political, economic and legal influences. At the same time, they cling to a realist belief that the products of science may state a truth about the world, or at least something so similar to truth as it is commonly understood at a given point in history that the practical discipline of law does not need to concern itself with the difference. In sum, Daubert adopts what Stephen Cole calls a realist-constructivist view of science, that is, science is socially constructed both in the laboratory and in the wider community, but the construction is constrained by input from the empirical world.
80 It rejects what he calls a relativist-constructionist position that claims nature has little or no influence on the cognitive content of science.
From this perspective, Kumho Tire is important because it refuses to adopt a different position with respect to nonscientific evidence. It, too, assumes that expertise is not simply a social construct. Expert opinions may be more or less true and an examination of the nature of an expert's reasoning will assist courts in assessing the merits of an expert's position.
There is a large dose of pragmatism in all of this, of course, and the Daubert rule itself has been cited as an example of "the common law's genius for muddling through on the basis of experience rather than logic."
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In sum, the recent Supreme Court opinions on the admissibility of expert opinion testimony adopt the following position concerning scientific knowledge: (a) Scientific and other expert knowledge is strongly influenced by political, economic, and legal influences on expert communities and on individual experts. (b) Nevertheless, scientific knowledge is not simply a social construct. Rather, the opinions adopt a realist position; through the use of proper methods we can know with some degree of certainty which of our judgments about the world are correct. From the point of view of science, this complex and, somewhat contradictory position may leave a good deal to be desired. From the point of view of the legal system, however, the position adopted in Daubert and Kumho Tire has much to recommend it. It positions the courts in a middle position, agreeing with fundamental premises of scientific epistemology and simultaneously recognizing that scientists and scientific communities share the common human frailties. And, as one might expect, it extends law's empire by making the judge, not the expert community, the final arbitrator of what constitutes acceptable expertise. This is not to suggest that relying on courts to assume this responsibility will always lead to well-reasoned decisions. In Daubert, Chief Justice Rehnquist, concurring in part and dissenting in part, expressed doubts about judicial ability to occupy a science-vetting role:
The Court speaks of its confidence that federal judges can make a "preliminary assessment of the reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue." The Court then states that a "key question" to be answered in deciding whether something is "scientific knowledge" "will be whether it can be (and has 80 been) tested." Following this sentence are three quotations from treatises, which not only speak of empirical testing, but one of which states that the " 'criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability or testability.' " I defer to no one in my confidence in federal judges; but I am at a loss to know what is meant when it is said that the scientific status of a theory is its "falsifiability," and I suspect that some of them will be too.
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Six years later, in Allison v. McGhan Medical Corporation, 83 an 11th Circuit court appeared to express ambivalence while asserting the need to assume the role of gatekeeper:
While meticulous Daubert inquiries may bring judges under criticism for donning white coats and making determinations that are outside their field of expertise, the Supreme Court has obviously deemed this less objectionable than dumping a barrage of questionable scientific evidence on a jury, who would be even less equipped than the judge to make reliability and relevance determinations and more likely than the judge to be awestruck by the expert's mystique. Also a judge may enlist outside experts to assist in this sometimes difficult decision. Using independent court-appointed experts may serve to quell the pseudo-scientist criticism. 84 The reservations expressed in these two cases about the universal competence of judges to understand the scientific issues are brought home in a recent study by Gatowski and her colleagues. 85 Those authors interviewed 400 state trial court judges, sometimes supplementing the telephone interview with a written questionnaire. The judges, from all 50 states and the District of Columbia, were asked about their attitudes toward the Daubert criteria and about the gate-keeping role of the judge.
The overwhelming majority of judges (91%) asserted that gate-keeping was an appropriate role for the judiciary and that the Daubert guidelines were useful criteria. In an effort to assess how well judges understood the concepts, the survey then asked judges how they would apply the four Daubert guidelines. Although over 90% of the judges seemed to understand the criteria of peer review/ publication and general acceptance, their understanding of the other two criteria was poor. Only 6% of the judges gave answers that indicated a clear understanding of falsifiability. Only 4% indicated a clear understanding of error rates.
This survey does not measure how well judges are able to apply criteria in the context of an actual case, 86 nor does it tell us about how well federal judges understand these concepts. The actual written opinions of federal district and appellate courts often exhibit a fairly good understanding of Daubert principles. Nonetheless, the survey results highlight the as yet unanswered question of the overall level of judicial competence.
Another unanswered question is whether jurors are better or worse than judges in assessing the reliability of expert testimony. Is the assertion made in Allison 87 that judges, whatever their deficiencies, will, on average, perform better than juries in evaluating expert testimony correct? The body of available data comparing the performance of judges versus juries is too thin to allow any reasonable judgment, although a review of literature on jury performance with regard to expert testimony indicates that the often asserted claim, repeated in Allison, that juries tend to be "awestruck by the expert's mystique" is not warranted. 88 Similarly, it shows that the judgments of both judges and juries may be affected by heuristics, cognitive short-cuts that influence and sometimes distort decisionmaking. 89 Currently missing is a set of direct comparisons between the reactions of judges and juries to expert testimony based on both claims that would pass muster under Daubert or Frye and on those that would fail.
We have suggested that Daubert struck a reasonable balance between a realist and social constructionist view of science. However, it remains to be seen whether in practice the Daubert test, or for that matter the Frye test, will produce a similar balance in the allocation of tasks between judge and jury.
